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This thesis is an attempt to compare the current legislative and military 
posture of the United States, in its effort to deal with a potentially growing domestic 
terrorist threat, with that of Great Britain. The introductory chapter presents the 
argument that the United States may learn valuable lessons by examining the British 
response to domestic terrorism. The second chapter takes a historical look at the 
development of U.S. legislation that defined the President's authority to call forth the 
militia and federal troops for domestic use. The third chapter examines the British use 
of emergency legislation as well as their decision to employ the army in an effort to 
curtail domestic terrorism posed by the Irish Republican Army when local police 
efforts failed. The fourth chapter concludes with a discussion on current U.S. 
legislation dealing with domestic terrorism and on the lessons the United States may 
learn from the British experience as the U.S. continuously adjusts to a changing 
domestic security environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent terrorist actions within the continental United 
States have heightened the awareness of the American public to 
the threat terrorism poses to the nation's continued domestic 
tranquility. The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 
and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 
1995, coupled with the growing anti -government movement 
symbolized by the Waco, Ruby Ridge and Freemen sieges have 
forced Congress and the Executive to respond to the public's 
demand for increased domestic security. That response has 
taken the form of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996. 
While the legislation stopped just short of repealing the 
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which currently prevents the 
military from participating in the search, seizure and arrest 
of citizens within the sovereign terri tory of the United 
States, the debate was robust enough to encourage those who 
sought the repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act to remain 
confident that future legislation may accomplish the task. 
Domestic terrorism has been a constant in United States 
history. While an appropriate and lengthy discussion may be 
warranted on the various definitions of domestic terrorism, I 
will forego the discussion. In this thesis, terrorism is 
1 
defined as "the systematic use of murder and destruction, and 
the threat of murder and destruction in order to terrorize 
individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding 
to the terrorist's political demands. " 1 Defined like this, 
terrorism can be domestic or international. 
By domestic I mean acts of terrorism perpetrated by 
individuals or organizations of any nationality within the 
continental United States. I define international terrorism as 
acts committed by individuals or groups against Americans or 
American interests abroad. In the case of international 
terrorism, the President is not restricted in his use of the 
military. This thesis focuses on domestic terrorism in order 
to examine the past and current legislation that imposes 
severe restrictions on the Executive in its ability to use the 
military to combat domestic violence. 
Legislation was created and continually amended in order 
to strike a balance between the need of the federal government 
to preserve and protect the Union from a combination of forces 
"too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of 
judicial proceedings," and the need to preserve the civil 
liberties of its citizens. An enduring legacy of the 
legislation has been the Posse Comitatus Act. However, it is 
only recently that the terrorist threat has become 
1Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, (London: Macmilan, 1977), 51. 
2 
sufficiently serious to warrant a reexamination of Posse 
Comitatus. 
The transition of a state from a free and open society to 
one that limits or temporarily suspends the civil rights of 
its citizens for the good of the whole can be a slow and 
challenging process. Some may insist that the United States' 
tradition of democracy may prevent it from ever imposing 
severe restrictions upon its citizens or allowing the passage 
of legislation which may be perceived as posing a threat to 
the civil liberties of its citizens. 
This study employs a historical and comparative study 
method. Through a historical legislative review, I intend to 
show in Chapter II that, while some may see the domestic 
employment of the military as contrary to the original intent 
of the founding fathers, and contrary perhaps to our nation's 
traditions, American history is replete with examples of 
domestic use of the military in law enforcement under the 
strict guidelines of the Constitution. 
I will show that the original intent of the various 
legislative acts restricting the domestic use of the military 
by the President was intended to protect citizens' civil 
liberties against a government that could become repressive 
and which had a standing army at its call. With the memory of 
the British Red Coats enforcing the will of the British 
3 
government still fresh on their minds, the founding fathers 
and subsequent Congresses sought to protect the citizens of 
the United States from similar abuse. 
Still, they had to confront the dilemma of how to provide 
the President a collective means to protect the Union, while 
at the same time, maintaining the individual sovereignty of 
the states. The progression in which the legislation developed 
clearly attempted to give the President the necessary 
authority to call forth the militia and the regular army while 
limiting the circumstances in which he could utilize them. 
I will show that current restrictive legislation, namely 
the Posse Comitatus Act, came about as a result of the 
Executive's looseness in its delegation of authority to use 
military troops domestically, particularly during 
Reconstruction, and this led Congress to rein in much of the 
authority of the President to use the military domestically. 
I conclude the chapter with an analysis which states my belief 
that the current restrictive legislation is a result of the 
early Congress' concerns of how, not whether, the military 
should be used domestically. 
In Chapter III, I introduce a legislative and military 
comparison with Great Britain. I explore the use and 
effectiveness of emergency legislation which included 
proscription, exclusion orders and internment as a means to 
4 
combat domestic terrorism. Furthermore, I examine the reasons 
behind the British decision to escalate the use of force to 
combat the IRA. I show how in response to the increased 
violence brought about by the IRA in Northern Ireland and the 
inability of the police to handle the escalation of violence, 
the British government progressed from the use of their 
police, to the use of their regular Army to finally the use of 
their elite military, the Special Air Service Regiment, in an 
effort to not only quell the violence but also eradicate the 
IRA. I conclude the chapter with my analysis of whether the 
combination of a broader use of the military and vigorous 
anti-terrorism legislation has had an effect on the ability to 
nullify the IRA as a terrorist threat. 
I conclude this thesis with a discussion on President 
Clinton's proposed Omnibus Counterrorism Bill, and its attempt 
to repeal the Posse Comitatus Act. Additionally, I briefly 
examine the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, a scaled-down version of the omnibus bill that passed 
in April of 1996. I also discuss how the United States may 
learn valuable lessons from the British army's assessment of 
what its own role should be in the domestic affairs of Britain 
following its involvement in Northern Ireland. Finally, I 
discuss how the United States may also use the British 
experience as a way of thinking about the future. The United 
5 
State may study the British example of combining vigorous 
anti-terrorism legislation with the domestic use of the 
military as a analytical tool. The United States may someday 
have to respond more forcibly to a growing domestic terrorist 
threat. In doing so the U.S. may eventually reach the point 
when the restriction imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act may be 
repealed. This comparative analysis may provide some insights 
as to the direction in which the United States may choose to 
travel in its efforts to adjust to a potentially changing 




II. THE HISTORICAL MILITARY RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERRORISM 
The United States' legislation on the Presidential use of 
the military to combat domestic violence has come under close 
scrutiny as a result of recent terrorist activities within the 
United States. An early version of the latest antiterrorism 
bill enacted proposed the elimination of the Posse Comitatus 
Act of 1878. 2 Although this proposal was dropped from the 
final version, it raised the question of the continued utility 
of the Posse Comitatus Act and whether the future security 
environment might dictate the need to reevaluate the domestic 
role of the military. This chapter examines the history of 
related legislation that has brought the United States to its 
current policy on the use of the military. 
A historical review will reveal that the current 
restrictions imposed on the President derive from legislation 
that dealt with a security environment totally different from 
-that which the United States might face in the near future. As 
a result, it remains to be seen whether the Posse Comitatus 
Act is likely to be revised under the weight of current and 
potential future terrorist acts. 
20n February 10 1995, a counterterrorism bill drafted by the Clinton 
Administration was introduced in the Senate asS. 390 and in the House of 
Representatives as H.R. 896. 
7 
A. SHAYS' REBELLION 
Historians point to Shays' Rebellion in 1786-1787 in 
western Massachusetts as the catalyst for the debate which 
helped shape the Constitution in defining the power of the 
states, the Executive and the people regarding the use of the 
military in enforcing the domestic laws of the Union. 3 
In 1786, the state of Massachusetts was divided in two as 
far as its economic structure was concerned. In the east, the 
population was composed of individuals involved in mercantile 
interests. These individuals dominated the political makeup of 
the state, monopolizing both the legislative and judicial 
branches. Conversely, the west was populated by farmers who 
were suffering from economic depression, scarcity of 
circulable currency, disproportionate taxes, excessive legal 
fees, unfair court practices, and a large number of property 
seizures. 4 As a result of this imbalance the western farmers 
came together in protest in order to prevent the state's 
courts from convening to issue indictments against them. 
Daniel Shays,• a western farmer and former Captain in 
3The earliest history of the affair is George Minot, The Histoty of Insurrections in 
Massachusetts (Boston: James W. Burkett& Company., 1810) A popular account is 
Marion L. Starkley, A Little Rebellion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955). The best 
short scholarly account is in Robert J. Taylor, Western Massachusetts in the Revolution 
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1954. 
4Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Militaty Forces in Domestic Disorders 
1789-1878 (Washington D.C.: Center ofMilitary History, United States Army, 1988), 4. 
8 
George Washington's army, reluctantly came to lead the group 
of protesting farmers. A ground swell of support for the 
dissidents began to grow, due in part to the actions of the 
Massachusetts government which suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus and hal ted the unlawful assemblies. However, the 
state's coercive actions only served to strengthen the 
farmers' resolve and inadvertently brought sympathy from the 
state's militia who were called to suppress the rebellion. 
News of the rebellion had spread throughout the 
Confederation and conservatives began to realize that if a 
rebellion in one state could not be quelled by its own 
militia, then perhaps the same could happen in their states. 
The leaders among the Confederation of States indeed had cause 
for concern. George Washington, aware of the potential threat, 
stated that, "Commotions of this sort, like snow-balls, gather 
strength as they roll, if there is no opposition in the way to 
divide and crumble them."5 
The protection of Massachusetts proceeded on two fronts, 
at the federal and the state level. Henry Knox, the Secretary 
of War and a Massachusetts citizen, realizing that the state 
may have lacked the ability to protect itself from the 
5Coakley 5, citing John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington 
from the Original Manuscript Sources, 17 4 5-1799, 3 9 vols. (Washington, 
D.C.:Govemment Printing Office, 1931-44), 26:27. 
9 
rebellious citizens, and concerned with the fact that 
Massachusetts possessed one of the more important national 
arsenals, asked Congress to enlist additional men into the 
army from New England to aid in the protection of the 
Massachusetts government. Recognizing the potential threat to 
the Confederation, Congress quickly approved an additional 
1,100 men to the ranks of the army, bringing the total number 
of soldiers in the Confederation to 2,000 men. However, the 
process would proceed far too slowly to be of immediate help 
to the Massachusetts government, thus leaving the state the 
responsibility of quelling the rebellion and bringing 
stability back to the Confederation. 
Massachusetts amassed a militia of nearly 5,000 men and 
faced the dissident citizens at the Springfield arsenal: 
Shays once again appeared at Springfield on 25 
January 1787 with a contingent of about 1,500 men, 
this time to demand arms from the national arsenal. 
He was confronted by General Shephard with about 
900 Hampshire County militia armed with muskets and 
cannon from the arsenal. Shepard's position was 
precarious for he had no assurance that he could 
rely on men whose friends and neighbors were in 
Shay's ranks. He chose the most impersonal way to 
deal with the matter-the use of artillery. When 
Shay's men refused to halt at his command, Shepard 
first ordered cannon fired over their heads. As 
they continued to advance, he directed several 
rounds in their midst. Three men fell dead, another 
mortally wounded; the rest, unprepared to face 
artillery fire, fled in panic. 6 
6Coakley, 6. 
10 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE ON THE POWER OF THE MILITARY TO 
INTERVENE IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES 
Shays' Rebellion quickly lost its momentum and came to a 
quick end as the Massachusetts government, through coercion 
and concession, was able to reassert its authority. However, 
the incident stirred in the minds of many the danger the 
rebellion caused to the stability of the Confederation. Many 
had reasoned that had the rebellion been headed by a more 
dynamic and capable leader, the outcome may have been 
different. This underlying fear brought forth the support of 
both liberals and conservatives in providing for a military 
means to protect the governmental integrity of the 
Confederation. George Washington commented that the rebellion 
should serve as a wake-up call: 
What stronger evidence can be given of the want of 
energy in our governments than these disorders? If 
there exists not a power to check them, what 
security has a man for life, liberty, or 
property? ... Thirteen Sovereignties pulling against 
each other, and all tugging at the federal head 
will soon bring ruin on the whole; whereas a 
liberal, and energetic Constitution, well guarded 
and closely watched, to prevent encroachments, 
might restore to us that degree of respectability 
and consequence, to which we had a fair claim and 
the brightest prospect of attaining. 7 
Thus, at the first Constitutional Convention, the 
question was not whether the new government would possess a 
71bid., 7. 
11 
greater ability to protect itself, but in what form and under 
whose control the power would fall. 
With few exceptions the convention delegates accepted the 
premise that the new government must possess a coercive power 
that the Confederation had lacked and that it must be capable 
of exercising this power in its own right without having to 
rely on the state governments. 8 Implicit in this power was the 
domestic use of the military, but with clearly defined 
limitations. 
The new government wanted to provide the new Union with 
three assurances: 
1. Assuring that no state could itself defy the authority 
of the federal union operating within its prescribed sphere; 
enforcing the "laws of the union" against combinations of 
individuals when civil law should fail. 
2. Protecting the states themselves against internal 
violence, rebellion, and insurrection against their authority. 
3. Assuring the states of "a republican form of 
government. " 9 
When the final version of the Constitution was ratified, 
the power to control the use of the military domestically was 





C. THE CALLING FORTH ACT OF 1795 
The Calling Forth Act of 1795, commonly referred to as 
the Law of 1795, was the first law which attempted to clarify 
the powers of the President in the use of federal troops in 
the execution of the laws of the Union. The law arose out of 
a reevaluation of the Calling Forth Act of 1792, the first law 
which delegated to the President powers to intervene in 
domestic disorders with the use of military force in the form 
of the militia. 
The first section of the Law of 17 95 dealt with the 
President's power to call forth the militia to counter an 
invasion or insurrection against a state's government. The 
section limited in scope the power of the President, only 
allowing him to respond to threats posed against a state's 
sovereignty, but not against the sovereignty of the federal 
government. Furthermore, the President could only utilize the 
militia in cases in which the threat originated from foreign 
nationals or Indian tribes. In those cases where the threat 
was posed by the citizens of the state itself, the President 
could only call forth the militia of another state for 
10Article II, Section 2., of the Constitution, reads in part, "The President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; ... ". 
13 
assistance, and could only do so upon the request of the 
legislature or Executive of the state deemed to be in need of 
assistance. 
The first section of the law addressed the fears of state 
legislatures in regards to limiting the unencumbered power of 
the President to call out the militia to quell domestic 
violence in a state regardless of the civil rights of its 
citizens. Yet, it was the second section of the law which 
seemed to elicit more serious debate over the powers of the 
President. 
The second section was controversial in that it was to 
help decide the power structure between the Executive and the 
States as to when the President could intervene in a State's 
domestic affairs. The President wanted more authority than the 
States were willing to give. The debate centered on the 
question of whether the President should be able to interfere 
in a state's internal affairs when there existed no request 
for assistance from that state. Whereas the first section 
dictated that the president must receive a request from a 
state's government before intervening in the domestic affairs 
of that state, the second section dealt with the power of the 
President to call forth the militia to ~execute the laws of 
the Union," when no request from a state existed: 
Whenever the laws of the United States shall be 
14 
opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in 
any state, by combinations too powerful to be 
suppressed by ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings, or the powers vested in the marshals 
by this act, the same being notified to the 
President by an associate justice, or the district 
judge, it shall be lawful for the President of the 
United States to call forth the militia of such 
state to suppress such combinations, and to cause 
the laws to be duly executed. And if the militia of 
the state, where such combinations may happen, 
shall refuse or be insufficient to suppress the 
same, it shall be lawful for the President if the 
legislature of the United States be not in session, 
to call forth and employ such numbers of the 
militia of any state or states most convenient 
thereto, as may be necessary, and the use of the 
militia, so to be called forth, may be continued, 
if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days 
after the commencement of the ensuing session. 11 
This section attempted to delineate between the sovereign 
powers of the state and the responsibility of the President to 
protect the Union as a whole. 
However, in a further attempt to find a balance between 
the Executive, the state and the citizen, limiting legislation 
was added in the third section of the law, requiring the 
president to first provide a cease and desist order to the 
recalcitrants before being authorized to use federal force: 
That whenever it may be necessary in the judgment 
of the President to use the militia force hereby 
directed to be called forth, the President shall 
forthwith and previous thereto, by proclamation, 
command such insurgents to disperse and retire 
peaceably to their respective homes, within a 
ul Statutes at Large 264. An Act to provide for calling forth the militia, to 
execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. 
15 
· limited time. 12 
With the passage of the Calling Forth Act of 17 92, a 
legal precedent was established around which all other 
legislation in regards to presidential powers in the use of 
federal troops domestically would evolve. The Calling Forth 
Act of 1795 was the outcome of the first reinterpretation of 
the 1792 law. This reinterpretation came as the result of the 
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, for it was during that rebellion 
that President George Washington would use federal forces to 
suppress the uprising of the citizens of western Pennsylvania 
who refused to comply with the federal excise tax on liquor 
and stills. 13 
The President, having first attempted a number of 
political options, turned to the military to quell the 
rebellion. A military expedition to western Pennsylvania was 
mounted under the control of General Henry Lee. The 
instructions that Washington gave to General Lee were 
significant in that "they h[e]ld an important place in the 
whole history of federal military intervention in domestic 
disorders in the United States, for they established the vital 
12Ibid. 
13 A detailed discussion on the origins and outbreak and eventual quelling of the 
Whiskey rebellion can be found in Coakley, Chapter two: The First Precedents: Neutrality 
Proclamation and Whiskey Rebellion and Chapter three: The Whiskey Rebellion: The 
Military Expedition. 
16 
principle that the purpose of the military was not to supplant 
but to support civil authority and that there should be no 
martial law or military trials of offenders."14 
Washington stated that the purposes for which the militia 
was called forth in the Whiskey Rebellion were twofold: 
1. To suppress the combinations which existed in some of 
the western counties of Pennsylvania in opposition to the laws 
laying duties upon spirits distilled within the United States 
and upon stills. 
2. To cause the laws to be executed. 15 
Additionally, he went on to state that the objectives would 
be accomplished using a combination of military force and 
judicial proceedings. The object of the military force would 
also be twofold: 
1. To overcome any armed opposition which may exist. 
2. To countenance and support the civil officers in the 
means of executing the laws. 16 
With those orders it became clear that the military was 
expected to assist civil authorities in the execution of 
federal laws, but only under the condition that they not take 
on the primary role of law enforcers, but rather assist those 
14Coakley, 54. 
15 American State Papers, Mise., 1: 112-13. 
161bid. 
17 
who enforce the laws. 
The first use of the military against citizens of the 
United States proved to be a successful venture. The Whiskey 
Rebellion was put down without shedding blood, and with few 
exceptions, the laws of the Union were executed by civil 
authorities under the protection of federal troops. 
The result of the Whiskey Rebellion was the reaffirmation 
of the power of the President to utilize federal troops to 
safeguard the laws of the Union. In George Washington's eyes, 
the principle had been sustained that federal laws would be 
enforced and that no turbulent faction could set them aside at 
its whim. 17 
Washington's appropriate and restrained use of troops so 
impressed Congress that they reenacted the Calling Forth Act 
of 1792. 18 Owing to the fact that Washington had not abused his 
authority in calling out the militia or in any way misused the 
forces under his command, Congress amended the act, known as 
the Calling Forth Act of 1795, deleting the requirement that 
17Coakley, 65-66. 
18ln response to states' continued fear of a standing army, harking back to the days 
of the British Red Coats, in his scrupulous regard for the law of 1792, Washington relied 
completely on the militia for the expedition, despite some suggestions that he should at 
least supplement them with regulars ... He satisfied himself, however, with a renewal of his 
old appeal that Congress establish a truly "well regulated militia," giving no hint that 
reliance on regulars might be less expensive and certainly more speedy and efficacious in 
instances ofthis sort. Coakley 67. 
18 
the President obtain a judicial certificate before using the 
military to deal with combinations against the laws "too 
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial 
proceedings" as well as the provision that he could only act 
when Congress was not in session. The Whiskey Rebellion thus 
resulted in the establishment of both a permanent law and a 
precedent for all future use of federal military for domestic 
disorders. 19 
D. THE LAW OF 1807 AND THE BURR CONSPIRACY 
With the law of 1795 firmly in place, the next amendment 
to the power of the President to call forth military troops, 
came with his ability to call forth regular troops as well as 
the militia to enforce federal laws. Up to this point, the 
President had been limited in his ability to utilize both the 
militia and regulars in areas he deemed necessary. The Calling 
Forth Act of 1795 had given the President the power to call 
forth the militia only to quell domestic disturbances. In 
addition, the Neutrality Act of 17 94 allowed him to call 
forth either the militia or the regulars to preserve the 
neutrality of the United States. The Law of 1807 would merge 
the two, allowing the President to utilize federal troops in 
all cases authorized under the law of 1795. 
In the early months of 1806 a conspiracy was being 
19Coakley, 68. 
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launched by Aaron Burr, the former Vice-President of the 
United States under President Thomas Jefferson who had set his 
sights on acquiring land, separating it from the rest of the 
Union and becoming its new chief executive: 
The estimate of Burr's intentions ... would have it 
that the former vice president hoped to raise a 
force in the West and float it down the Mississippi 
to New Orleans, timing his arrival with an uprising 
of dissident elements in the city. Once having 
seized power in New Orleans, the principal outlet 
for commerce of the entire trans-Appalachian West, 
he hoped, with the cooperation of [Brigadier 
General James Wilkinson, then commanding general of 
the U.S. Army in the West] and of either British or 
American elements, both to separate that section 
from the Union and to mount an expedition against 
West Florida and Mexico to add these Spanish 
domains to his realm. 20 
Upon learning of Burr's intentions, President Jefferson 
set out to protect the Union by stopping the insurrections 
that he felt would be necessary in order for Burr to carry out 
his plot. Jefferson resorted to two existing laws. The Calling 
Forth Law of 1795 gave him the authority to call forth the 
militia in the various states along the route Burr would have 
to travel to reach New Orleans. The second law utilized was 
the Neutrality Act of 1794. This law was enacted to allow the 
President to use both the militia and regular forces for the 
sole purpose of enforcing the United States' neutrality in 




the warring parties. The act allowed the President to utilize 
the military domestically to stop any citizen or combination 
of citizens who might attempt to wage an independent campaign 
against a country with which the United States was at peace: 
In every such case it shall be lawful for the 
President of the United States, or such other 
person as he shall have empowered for that purpose, 
to employ such part of the land or naval forces of 
the United States or of the militia thereof as 
shall be judged necessary for the purpose of taking 
possessions of, and detaining any such ship or 
vessel ... and also for the purpose of preventing 
the carrying on of any such expedition or 
enterprise from the territory of the United States 
against the territories or dominions of a foreign 
prince or state, with whom the United States are at 
peace21 • 
With Burr's plans to conduct raids against Spain, a country 
with which the United States was at peace, the President 
crafted his response around the Neutrality Act in order to 
bring to bear all the forces at his disposal, both regulars 
and the militia. 
As Burr headed down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, 
militia of several states lay in wait. Though crafty and 
elusive, Burr's forces had dwindled from 1,500 men and twenty-
eight boats down to ten boats and roughly 100 men by the time 
he reached the state of Mississippi. Having learned that he 
had been double-crossed by General Wilkinson and having 
212 Statutes at Large, 54. 
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learned that a large force awaited his arrival in New Orleans, 
Burr surrendered to the Mississippi militia. 22 
Jefferson had successfully brought to an end Burr's 
conspiracy through the use of both the militia and regular 
forces. Yet Jefferson was troubled by his lack of authority to 
use regulars in a domestic insurrection, which he rightly 
deemed the Burr conspiracy to be. 23 Jefferson drafted, sent 
forth to Congress and received the passage of a bill which 
gave him the authority to call forth both the militia and the 
regular forces in the quelling of domestic insurrection. The 
Law of 1807 provided: 
That in all cases of insurrection or obstruction to 
the laws, either of the United States or of any 
individual State or Territory, where it is lawful 
for the President of the United States to call 
forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing 
such insurrection or of causing the laws to be duly 
executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for 
the same purpose, such part of the land and naval 
force of the United States as shall be judged 
necessary, having first observed all the 
prerequisites of the law in that respect. 24 
E. "LINCOLN'S LAW", THE LAW OF 1861 
Once Jefferson secured the Law of 1807, which permitted 
the use of regular military forces in all cases where the Law 
22Though Burr surrendered, subsequent trials failed to produce any convictions 
against him. 
23Coakley, 83. 
242 Statutes at Large, 443. 
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of 1795 permitted only the use of the militia, presidents had 
a choice to opt for either forces in a variety of situations. 
Invariably presidents chose to utilize regulars. This was done 
largely to ensure that the forces being used would not be 
influenced by partisan loyal ties that existed among the 
various militia of the states. In subsequent presidencies, 
under the authority of the Law of 1807, the predominant choice 
was the use of regulars in such incidents as the Chesapeake 
and Ohio Canal Riots in 1834, the Dorr Rebellion in 1842 and 
the Kansas abolition skirmishes between 1854-1857. 25 
It wasn't until the Civil War that a change in the laws 
redefined the powers of the President in regards to the use 
of federal forces. As the southern states began their movement 
to secede from the Union, President Abraham Lincoln called 
upon Congress to grant him greater latitude in his ability to 
use the military to quell the rising rebellion. Congress 
responded by passing legislation on 29 July 1861 that left 
intact the sections of the 1795 and 1807 laws requiring the 
request of states before the President could commit troops 
within any given state. However, the new legislation vastly 
strengthened the President's authority to use both the militia 
25For a detailed description of these incidents see Robert W. Coakley, "The 
Jacksonian Era", pp. 91-110, "The Patriot War and Dorr Rebellion", pp. 119-127 and 
"Trouble in Kansas: First Phase", pp. 145-165 in The Role of Federal Military Forces in 
Domestic Disorders 1789-1878. 
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and regulars to suppress insurrections and execute the laws of 
the Union. The pertinent section of the new law read: 
That whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, 
combinations or assemblages of persons, or 
rebellion against the authority of the government 
of the United States, it shall become 
impracticable, in the judgement ·of the 
President ... to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States 
with any state territory ... it shall be lawful for 
the President ... to call forth the militia of any 
or all of the states of the Union, and to employ 
such part of the land and naval forces of the 
United States as he may deem necessary to enforce 
the faithful execution of the laws ... or to suppress 
such rebellion in whatever state or territory 
thereof the laws ... may be forcibly opposed or the 
execution thereof forcibly obstructed. 26 
The law amended the previous laws in that it added "rebellion" 
specifically to the obstructions and combinations that could 
be acted against under the law of 1795. It also entrusted the 
decision to use military force to the "judgement of the 
President" whenever he deemed it "impracticable" to enforce 
the law by ordinary means (the 1795 law had merely made it 
lawful for him to do so), and omitted any reference 
specifically to the powers of the federal marshals under the 
act as a means of enforcement short of the use of military 
force. 27 
The new law vastly strengthened the powers of the 
26Coakley, 228. 
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President that were authorized under the laws of 1795 and 
1807. The new law, designed to prevent the initiation of war, 
became in reality the statutory basis for federal troop 
intervention in lesser disturbances and it has remained the 
basic statute authorizing the President to employ troops to 
enforce federal law that was to be used in such instances as 
Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi, in the 
twentieth century. 28 
Despite the legislation, war did eventually break out, 
and as such the role of the military during the war, though 
domestic in nature, is not pertinent to this discussion on the 
role of the military during peace time. Therefore, the next 
issue of interest is how the military was employed 
domestically in one its first post-war domestic assignments in 
law enforcement. 
F. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN BATTLING THE KU KLUX KLAN 
1866-1871 
The decision to use federal troops to combat the threat 
-of the Ku Klux Klan offers a historical look a precedent-
setting legislation. The Presidential decision-making process 
of the late 1860's may be applicable today with the emergence 
of radical right-wing groups. 
In 1866 several young men in Pulaski, Tennessee organized 
28Ibid., 228-229. 
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themselves into what was known as the Ku Klux Klan. Members of 
the secret organization harassed and terrorized blacks, 
especially those who showed a penchant for independent 
thinking. Following the Civil War, and with the passage of the 
Reconstruction Acts, the Klan developed the political 
objective of waging a violent campaign against the local 
Republican parties in order to save its traditional way of 
life. 
Within' two years, offsprings of the original Klan sprung 
up in Alabama, North Carolina Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. The violence associated with these groups became 
so intense that the legislatures of many southern states found 
their civil law enforcement agencies lacking in their ability 
to handle the threat alone. From 1868 to 1871 Republican 
governors in the South found themselves confronted with 
combinations "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary 
course of judicial proceeding." 29 
Hardly had the new Republican state governments been 
installed than the legislatures of Alabama, Florida, 
Louisiana, and Tennessee had passed joint resolutions in 
keeping with the constitutional formula, asking the president 




Andrew Johnson refused the state government's requests for 
direct intervention of federal troops, he did evoke the little 
used Cushing Doctrine of 1854. This doctrine gave U.S. 
marshals and county sheriffs the right to "command all 
necessary assistance" within their respective districts, 
drawing on both military and civilians alike to serve on the 
posse comitatus to execute legal process. 31 Johnson chose to 
accept his Attorney General's interpretation of the doctrine 
that allowed for an indirect way for troops to be deployed to 
a state without the formalities of submitting a request to the 
President. Johnson preferred this method since it enabled him 
to respond to a threat without appearing dictatorial in the 
use of force. 
The War Department, upon receiving word of the 
President's intentions to make the military available for 
domestic use, began to prepare its commanders for the task at 
hand: 
The commanding officer summoned to posse duty would 
have to judge for himself the necessity and 
legality of the call and limit his action 
31 Caleb Cushing, Attorney General under President Pierce, issued the Cushing 
Doctrine. Cushing based his doctrine on that laid down by British Chief Justice William 
Mansfield in a case arisen out ofthe Lord Gordon Riots in 1780. It was essentially a 
doctrine of British law that had previously not been recognized as applying in America, at 
least as far as the military was concerned. The Cushing Doctrine would allow a U.S. 
marshal to call on federal military forces in his district without reference to the president 
whatsoever. 
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absolutely to "proper aid in the execution of the 
lawful precept exhibited to him by the marshal or 
sheriff." If time would permit, indeed, every 
demand from a civil officer for military aid should 
be referred to the president and "in all cases the 
highest commander whose orders can be given in time 
to meet the emergency will alone assume 
responsibility for the action." And commanders were 
admonished to make timely disposition of their 
forces to anticipate trouble and preserve the 
peace, instead of relying on commitment under the 
posse comitatus doctrine. 32 
This order seemed to indicate that the military could actively 
participate in law enforcement activities against the Klan 
under the posse comitatus doctrine, but they would require the 
orders of the President to be involved in any large scale 
disturbances, and then only upon receipt of a request from 
state legislatures or Executives. Armed with the power of the 
posse comitatus, the states attempted to fight the Klan 
utilizing the combined powers of U.S. marshals and the 
military. 
The election of Ulysses S. Grant as President of the 
United States in 1868 brought to power a man more robust in 
his intentions to utilize the military in the fight against 
the Klan. Armed with an official report of one his senior 
generals which stated in part that, "There can be no doubt of 
the existence of numerous insurrectionary movements known as 
the 'Ku Klux Klan,' who, shielded by their disguise, by the 
32 Coakley, 301. 
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secrecy of their movement, and by the terror they inspire, 
perpetrate crime with impunity. " 33 Grant asked for and received 
legislation giving him stronger powers to combat what he 
considered to be violent opposition to the policies of the 
United States government guaranteeing equal rights to all 
citizens. 34 
The new legislation was designed to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment permitting blacks to vote. Known collectively as the 
Enforcement Acts, the legislation made a number of crimes 
federal offenses and as such made the perpetrators subject to 
the laws of federal jurisdiction. The first of the three acts 
which composed the Enforcement Acts made it a federal crime 
for two or more people to use coercion as a means to prevent 
citizens from voting. The second act provided for the 
appointment of supervisors of elections and made it a federal 
crime to prevent them from carrying out their duties. 
Among the most important of the three pieces of 
legislation that composed the Enforcement Acts was the third 
act, which imposed strict federal penalties upon anyone who 
acted under cover of state law to deprive a citizen of his 
civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or conspired to 
33 Coakley, 307, citing Terry to AG, 14 Aug 69, SW Rpt, 1869, pp. 89-94. James 
E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction. 1861-1865. (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State Press), p. 200. 
29 
"obstruct the U.S. Government; hinder the execution of its 
law; intimidate its officers or any people testifying in 
court; or travel in disguise upon the public highway or upon 
the premises of any person or class to deprive them of their 
rights. " 35 
Section 3 of the third act, which was to become part of 
the permanent law of the United States governing military 
intervention to "enforce the laws of the union" reads as 
follows: 
That in all cases where insurrection, domestic 
violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in 
any State shall so obstruct or hinder the execution 
of the laws thereof, and of the United States, as 
to deprive any portion or class of the people of 
such state of any of the rights, privileges, or 
immunities, or protection, named in the 
Constitution and secured by this act, and the 
constituted authorities of such state shall either 
be unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, 
fail in or refuse protection of the people in such 
rights, such facts shall be deemed a denial by such 
state of equal protection of the laws to which they 
are entitled under the Constitution of the United 
States; and in all such cases, or whenever any such 
insurrection, violence, unlawful combination, or 
conspiracy shall oppose or obstruct the laws of the 
United States, or the due execution thereof, or 
impede or obstruct the due course of justice under 
the same, it shall be lawful for the President, and 
it shall be his duty to take such measures, by the 
employment of the militia or the land forces of the 
United States, or either, or by other means, as he 
may deem necessary for the suppression of such 
insurrection, domestic violence, or combinations; 
and any person who shall be arrested under this and 
the preceding section shall be delivered to the 
35Coakley, 309. 
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marshal of the proper district, to be dealt with 
according to the law. 36 
With the power of the Enforcement Acts, the President was able 
to utilize the military, upon proclamation of martial law, to 
effect the arrests of several hundred Klan members and try 
them in military courts. 
The military was generally successful in assisting the 
civil authority in breaking up the Klan in several states. 
Providing marshals the necessary manpower to cover a large 
geographic area and assist with arrests of Klansmen, the 
army's use as a posse was very effective. While the Klan 
still remained as an entity well past 1871, due in part to the 
lack of federal forces needed to weed out every member,· the 
President and the military were able to show their resolve in 
protecting the civil liberties of all citizens. 
G. THE END OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT OF 1878 
With legislation firmly in place, few congressmen 
questioned President Grant's right to use military force in 
domestic disturbances. However, several did raise questions 
about the frequent use of posses under the Cushing Doctrine, 
noting that command of Army forces fell into the hands of 
marshals and sheriffs without any approval of the Commander in 
36Ibid., 309-310. 
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Chief. 37 As a result, the military became pawns in several· 
power struggles. An example is the use of the military in the 
South. The Southern Democrats, in order to protect their 
interests, had encouraged the President to utilize the 
military under the Fugitive Slave Act to return escaped slaves 
back to them, only to find a few years later the same troops 
still in southern states enforcing unpopular laws and 
supporting Republican state governments supported by a 
Republican President. It was this frequent and subsequent 
misuse of the military which would change the role they would 
play in all future responses to domestic political terrorism. 
The Presidential election of 1876 was full of political 
maneuvering. The candidates were Samuel Tilden of the 
Democratic party and Rutherford B. Hayes of the Republican 
party. The Republicans had remained in control of most of the 
southern states' legislatures following the Civil War and it 
was a foregone conclusion that Hayes would win the 
presidential elections with the backing of the Republican 
political machine. Tilden's victory came as a great surprise 
to everyone. The north was mortified to learn of the election 
results and vowed not to recognize the results, thus creating 
a potential constitutional crisis. 
With a crisis looming, Democratic congressmen from 
37Ibid., 343. 
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several southern states met behind closed doors with members 
of the Republican party in order to reach a compromise. The 
Democratic congressmen argued that military troops stationed 
in southern states were being used to harass civilians, not 
only during elections, where they allegedly intimidated voters 
into voting for Republican candidates, but also interfered 
unnecessarily with civil governments in the states. In the 
case of Louisiana, troops had even removed an entire 
legislature and replaced it with one politically more 
acceptable to the radical Republican federal government. 38 
A number of Republican congressmen sympathized with the 
Democratic coalition, and a number of states were still 
sensitive to the sovereignty issue. As a result, a compromise 
was worked out wherein several Democratic congressmen would 
throw their support behind Hayes in exchange for a promise 
that federal troops would be removed from the south. The 
general public knew nothing of the compromise and were none 
the wiser when the election results proclaimed that Hayes had 
won the presidency. 
Although Hayes thus won the election, the 45th Congress' 
majority resided in the hands of the Southern Democrats. Less 
than two years after the election, a rider was attached to the 
Army appropriations bill which stated: 
38Ibid., 342. 
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From and after the passage of this act it shall not 
be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the 
United States as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, 
for the purpose of executing the laws, except in 
such cases and under such circumstances as such 
employment of said force may be expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or by act of 
Congress; and no money appropriated by this act 
shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred 
in the employment of any troops in violation of 
this section and any person willfully violating the 
provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall 
be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand 
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or 
by both such fine and imprisonment. 39 
Thus with its passage on 18 June 1878, the Amendment known as 
the Posse Comitatus Act brought to an end the participation of 
federal military forces in combating domestic political 
terrorism, a practice which had existed for the first ninety 
years under the Constitution. 
It is interesting to reflect upon the elections of 1876 
and ponder whether, had Hayes won the election outright, would 
the Posse Comitatus Act now be among the laws of the United 
States. As tenuous as the answer may be, the law has withstood 
constitutional and political challenges to date. 
H. ANALYSIS 
In regards to the domestic use of the military, the 
legislative history of the United States had progressed along 
3920 Statutes at Large 145-52. Today it is Section 1385 of Title 18 of the US 
Code. 
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a consistent path for nearly one hundred years. The founding 
fathers, mindful of the British use of the Red Coats to 
enforce the unpopular measures of the British Parliament, made 
explicit efforts to prevent the same from occurring in the 
fledgling United States. 
Congress proceeded slowly in its efforts to define the 
authority of the President in calling forth the militia and 
regular forces to quell domestic disturbances. Congress had to 
maintain the delicate balance between the federal government's 
right to protect the Union and the states' right to maintain 
their sovereignty in internal affairs. 
Presidents had shown restraint and good judgement in 
their use of the military under the limited authority granted 
to them. Accordingly, Congress responded by slowly granting 
the President additional powers. Progressively, the power of 
the President expanded from simply being able to call forth 
the militia to overcome resistance to federal or state 
authority as we saw in the Calling Forth Act of 1795, to the 
outright authority, found in the "Lincoln Law", to call forth 
federal forces when in his "judgement" the President deemed it 
necessary to use them to maintain the domestic tranquility of 
the Union. 
The historical record shows that it wasn't abuse of power 
by the presidents that eventually led to the imposition of the 
35 
Posse Comitatus Act. Rather, it was the loose way in which 
presidents kept track of the power they delegated to those 
under them in the use of the military that pushed Congress 
towards changing the laws. By the time Reconstruction arrived 
there existed prescribed means to circumvent the President in 
obtaining the use of the military. The Cushing Doctrine gave 
federal judges and marshals the means to employ the military 
in a number of circumstances without resorting to presidential 
permission, and it was during these employments of troops 
where accountability was lost. However, as is well known, 
accountability rests with the senior leadership and in the 
cases discussed prior to Posse Comitatus, the accountability 
rested with the President. 
When Congress acted to prevent the use of the military 
domestically it was more in response to how the troops were 
being used rather than whether they should be used. But is was 
the Executive which suffered the backlash, having subsequently 
to govern under the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Future domestic security requirements may require the 
nation to reexamine the current restrictions on the domestic 
use of the military. If terrorist events such as the World 
Trade Center and Oklahoma bombings continue, Congress' 
concerns may be the exact opposite of those arising during the 
original debate on Posse Comitatus. The resultant question may 
36 
be, not how the military will be used, but rather, why are 
they not being used. 
37 
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH LEGISLATIVE, 
JUDICIAL AND MILITARY RESPONSE TO AN EMERGING DOMESTIC 
TERRORIST THREAT: THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY 
The United States' legislative history shows an 
increasing tendency to limit the President's ability to 
utilize the military domestically to combat violence. In 
contrast to the United States experience, the British have 
chosen to increase their government's authority to respond to 
domestic threats with armed force. The value of a brief 
comparative study between the U.S. and British experience is 
its exemplification of how a democratic society similar in 
nature to the United States, can and will dramatically adjust 
its legislative, judicial and military strategies in an 
at·tempt to maintain domestic tranquility. While the 
differences in the constitutional structures of the United 
States and Great Britain may appear, on the surface, to be too 
wide to serve as accurate predictor of future U.S. responses 
to domestic terrorism, the British experience still serves as 
a good case study from which to draw a number of ideas which 
the U.S. might heed in the not-too-distant future. 
As mentioned earlier, the World Trade Center and Oklahoma 
City bombings have opened the collective eyes of the country, 
raising renewed questions in regards to the domestic security 
of the United States. A question that may be asked is, how 
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many more Oklahoma City-type bombings will have to occur 
within the United States before the citizens are willing to 
accept a change in the government's policy on the use of the 
military? Will both the public and politicians demand such a 
change should bombings start occurring, for example, once a 
month? Will the President demand the unrestricted authority to 
bring to bear all resources, including the military, against 
a domestic terrorist threat? 
The British government faced similar questions in 
Northern Ireland. After the partition of Ireland in 1921, the 
Irish Republican Army began a systematic, though erratic 
terrorist campaign to remove the British government from 
Northern Ireland and reunify the island. 
The passage of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, not 
only formally created Northern Ireland, it also provided the 
legal framework which gave Northern Ireland its authority to 
be self-ruled under the auspices of the British Government. 
The Act transferred legislative power from Westminster, 
Britain's Parliament, to Stormont, the new Parliament of 
Northern Ireland. Despite this expansive grant of power, 
Westminster reserved for itself authority over such areas as 
foreign policy, defense, taxation, external trade, and all 
40 
matters relating to the Crown. 40 
With the Stormont parliament in place, the British 
government's attitude towards the terrorist situation in 
Ulster was one of ignorant bliss. As long as violence remained 
confined to Irish soil, and Stormont kept it to acceptable 
levels, the British were satisfied with staying out of 
Ulster's internal affairs. 
However, by 1969, the British view was that violence in 
Ulster had crossed the threshold of what was acceptable. This 
occurred in connection with the civil rights movement, and 
initiated the period known as the "Troubles." 
The Troubles overwhelmed both the capabilities of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, the national police force of 
Northern Ireland, and of the Stormont government itself. Once 
this occurred, the British government was forced to reenter 
the picture, first in 1969 with the introduction of army 
troops to the area, followed by a series of legislative and 
judicial reforms culminating in 1972 with the decision to 
dissolve the Stormont Parliament and institute direct rule 
from Westminster. 41 
This chapter begins with a brief history of the IRA, 
40John E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule ofLaw 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 51. 
41 Since 1972, Ulster has returned 12 members of parliament to the 651- member 
British Parliament at Westminster. 
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examining their motives and actions surrounding their efforts 
to reunify Ireland. The second section will look at the 
legislative measures employed by the British parliament, and 
the final section deals with the British decision to escalate 
their use of force in combating the IRA, progressing from the 
use of the police to the regular army to finally using the 
military's elite unit, the Special Air Service. 
A. THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
The Irish Republican Army's origins go back to 1858 with 
the Irish Fenians. One of the Fenians' goals was the forceful 
separation of Ireland from Great Britain, and the creation of 
an Irish republic. The IRA carried out the paramilitary 
functions of the organization. Although their first attempts 
in 1867 ended with poor results, they continued their fight, 
subsequently in the Easter Rising of 1916 and the Anglo-Irish 
war. 
During that war, the IRA's assault against the British 
continued for a number of years until a cease-fire was agreed 
to in 1921 in order to enter into negotiations with the 
British government. Arising out of those negotiations was the 
Government of Ireland Act which created an independent 
Republic of Ireland. However, to the great dismay of many 
Irishmen, the Act also partitioned six counties in the north 
creating Northern Ireland as an entity which was to remain 
42 
part of the United Kingdom. 
The partition created a Northern Ireland that was 
populated with a majority of Protestants, leaving the minority 
Catholics fighting for basic civil rights that were being 
denied them through prejudicial treatment from the majority. 
Consequently, the IRA then took up two causes: reunifying the 
two Irelands into one Republic and fighting the ruling 
majority in an attempt to gain a measure of equality within 
Ulster. 42 
The IRA began their mission in earnest in Northern 
Ireland in the late 1930's. In 1939, the IRA issued an 
ultimatum to the British to withdraw from Irish soil. When the 
British government failed to respond to their demands, the IRA 
commenced terrorist attacks in both Northern Ireland and on 
the British mainland. A series of bombings engineered by the 
IRA resulted in the deaths of five people43 • Unfortunately for 
the IRA, the bombings did nothing but stir anti-IRA sentiment 
throughout Britain and the Protestant community of Northern 
Ireland. The deaths caused by the IRA also produced a backlash 
from the Catholic communities who had not yet developed an 
appreciation for the terrorist tactics of the IRA. 
42Ulster is the commonly used collective name for the six counties which make up 
Northern Ireland. 
43John Magee, Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict (London: Routledge, 1974), 
24. 
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Consequently, recruitment fell to a point where the continued 
existence of the group may have come into doubt. 
Despite their dire state, the IRA pushed forward with 
their philosophy of violent revolt. In 1956, the organization 
launched another campaign, this time against the north's 
Stormont Parliament. The prolonged campaign of bombings, 
shootings and kidnaping lasted six years and cost the lives of 
six Royal Ulster Constabularies and eleven republicans, as 
well as causing damage in the millions of dollars. 44 The result 
of the campaign was again severe for the IRA. The violent 
manner in which they carried out their politics had not only 
alienated a large portion of the Catholic community but also 
caused a division within the organization itself. 
By the early 1960's, the organization could be divided 
into two camps: those who wanted to create a unified Ireland 
at any cost and those who sought, not to reunify, but rather 
to transform Northern Ireland in a socialist state. Although 
the latter had the political support of Sinn Fein, their 
political wing, it would be the former which would continue 
the terrorist attacks. As a result of these internal 
disagreements, by the time the Troubles began in 1969, the IRA 
found it lacked both the weapons or the members to defend the 




After suffering the embarrassment of not being able to 
defend the Catholic interests, a number of veteran members 
splintered off from the "Officials" of the IRA and created 
their own "Provisional" wing. The Provisionals supported a 
unified Ireland while the Officials supported Marxism, and 
even though in practice the two organizations have existed for 
twenty-five years, the Officials have only occasionally 
resorted to violence. The Officials' last operation occurred 
in 1979, with the murder of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 
principal political advisor, Airey Neave. The Provisionals, on 
the other hand, have made no serious effort to hide their 
intentions, discussed later, of orchestrating a violent revolt 
against the British army who had entered Northern Ireland in 
1969. 
Along with their campaign of overt violence which 
included attacks on the military, the bombings of shops and 
offices and public buildings, the Provisionals employed the 
tactic of "winning the hearts and minds." Their strategy 
appeared to have been to draw the army into the Catholic 
ghettos, where their searching and interrogations would gain 
the movement general support from the population. The 
instituting of internment was probably their most successful 
achievement, for they calculated that the wholesale arrest of 
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members of the minority, many of whom were not involved in 
subversive activities, would stir up great resentment and 
provide the IRA with ideal conditions under which to operate. 45 
B. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
The British attempted to combat the IRA terrorist threat 
on three fronts, legislative, judicial and military, through 
the employment of three important legislative means: the 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts, internment and the use of 
supergrasses. The distinction between legislative and military 
responses, though useful analytically, is in practice blurred 
because often, for example in the case of internment, it is 
the army that implements legislative measures. 
The judicial measures are found inherently among the 
legislation discussed, in part due to the British system of 
common law which relies heavily on precedents and the rule of 
law, in contrast with the United States' reliance on the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, the British 
experience demonstrated that legislative and judicial reforms 
alone cannot solve the terrorism problem completely. While 
they do seek to limit the means that the terrorists may 
utilize, they do not address their motives. 
451bid., 26. 
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1. Prevention Of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
was enacted in 1974 by Westminster in response to increased 
terrorist acts conducted by the IRA. 46 With swift efficiency 
the Act was passed in Parliament after only two days of 
discussion. The purpose of the legislation was to impose 
serious restrictions on the activities and movements of 
suspected terrorists. 
The PTA, which was considered temporary legislation at 
the time, has been renewed repeatedly: PTA 1976, PTA 1984 and 
its present form, PTA 1989. What separates the earlier 
versions from the present one is that each successive version 
had applied a more severe application of the measures of the 
previous PTA; additionally, the earlier versions were subject 
to review and were temporary; the latest version was set to be 
a permanent law. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 consisted of 
three main parts. The first proscribed membership in 
organizations related to terrorist activities. The second part 
permitted the secretary of state to exclude any individual 
460n November 21, 1974, a bomb hidden in a pub in Birmingham killed 21 people 
and injured more than 180 others. The alleged perpetrators were arrested the same day 
and subsequently convicted, but the IRA had demonstrated that terrorism in the United 
Kingdom was no longer a problem neatly confined to the isolated province of Ulster. John 
E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule ofLaw (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 118. 
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from traveling from Great Britain to Northern Ireland or from 
Northern Ireland to Great Britain. The third part of the act 
extended the power of the police to arrest and detain suspects 
for questioning. Under the provisions of the act, a person who 
has been arrested could be held for 48 hours. The period of 
detention could be extended for an additional five days in 
all, bringing the total time to seven days if the authorities 
so desired. 
a. Proscription 
Proscription prevents any individual from being a 
member of, or supporting a prohibited organization. Currently 
the only two organizations to be proscribed are the IRA and 
the Irish National Liberation Army. Since the proscription 
provision only applies in Great Britain, it is notable in that 
it acknowledges that the IRA terrorist threat had grown to 
become a serious domestic concern. 
Proscription is retained mainly for its 
presentational effect, a statutory reflection of public 
abhorrence and condemnation of those organizations, and for a 
possible deterrent effect on public display of support 
activities like parades or paramilitary processions. 47 Since 
it is merely a cosmetic statute, one that in most likelihood 
cannot be repealed since it would send an implicit message 
47Ibid., 441. 
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that the proscribed organizations have become "acceptable", it 
has been recommended that it be modified to allow for a 
greater freedom of speech for those who simply agree with the 
principles but not the actions of a proscribed organization. 48 
The effect of proscription on the IRA's terrorist 
action in Great Britain has been minimal. Yet, however 
minimal, symbolic gestures do have a psychological impact on 
both the perpetrators and victims of terrorism, and Britain 
has been willing to try any measures which it feels may be 
effective. 
b. Exclusion Orders 
The second component of the PTA is the exclusion 
order. Under the PTA the secretaries of state for Great 
Britain and Ireland can exclude a person from entering any 
part of the United Kingdom, if it "appears expedient" to 
prevent acts of terrorism. 49 
The procedures needed to execute an exclusion order 
are relatively simple. Upon receipt of a report on an 
individual from the National Joint Unit at New Scotland Yard, 
the Secretary makes a decision based on the contents of the 
report. Should the Secretary determine that there exists 




sufficient evidence to support an exclusion order, one is 
issued. 
The person who is subject to the order, the 
detainee, is afforded the opportunity to challenge the order 
before a hearing officer appointed by the government. The 
detainee has no legal right to hear the evidence against him 
or question any of the government's witnesses. The detainee 
does have a right to counsel, but since the proceeding is 
administrative and not judicial, there can be no judicial or 
independent review of an exclusion order through habeas corpus 
proceedings unless there has been an abuse of discretion or 
bad faith on the part of the secretaries of state. 
The use of exclusion orders have been attacked by 
civil libertarians arguing that the process is ripe for abuse, 
arbitrary in its implementation, and lacking in its 
constitutional authority. Yet, those who are in charge of 
reviewing the laws find that terrorism creates the need for 
extraordinary measures. Lord Jellicoe defended the provision 
of the PTA: 
I was invited in March 1982 to review the operation 
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1976. I took some time to consider 
my reply ... partly because of my proposed terms of 
reference ... required the acceptance of "the 
continuing need for legislation against terrorism." 
I satisfied myself ... that some form of special 
legislation was indeed required to deal with the 
continuing threat posed by terrorism throughout the 
United Kingdom ... I have since become 
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convinced ... that if special legislation effectively 
reduces terrorism, as I believe it does, it should 
be continued as long as a substantial terrorist 
threat remains. 50 
Between 1974 and 1984, 358 applications for 
exclusion were submitted, and 310 were accepted. 51 However, 
because terrorists simply travel illegally, the effect of 
exclusion orders has resulted in more of a discussion of 
constitutionality than a significant impact on the prevention 
of terrorism. 
c. Habeas Corpus 
The third provision of the PTA deals with habeas 
corpus. Northern Irish police may arrest suspected terrorists 
under the act. The act allows the police to do so if they have 
reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed or has 
knowledge of a terrorist act. The police can then detain an 
individual for up to seven days before either releasing or 
charging him. 
The individual has little judicial recourse during 
the detention period. Since the arresting officer need only 
have a "reasonable suspicion" of a crime; he need not make a 
specific charge. With that standard, the detainee has little 
501bid., 141. 
51Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester, Eng: 
University Press, 1986), 69. 
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recourse to habeas corpus during his seven day incarceration. 
Additionally, the police can rearrest the suspect for another 
seven days, making the whole process, in a way, a form of 
internment. As with the other statutes of the PTA, the habeas 
corpus section raised more questions about constitutionality, 
but its deterrent effect was nil. 
2. Internment 
Internment is an executive measure. It involves detention 
without trial or charges of persons suspected of being a 
danger to the state. The British government adopted it on the 
mainland during the First and Second World Wars. Hitherto, 
they had resorted to this measure mainly in situations of 
colonial unrest and in disturbances in Ireland.~ 
Although internment was a British concept, the new 
government of Northern Ireland retained the practice. The 
initial legislative authority to use internment in Northern 
Ireland came immediately after the partition of Ireland in 
1921. The Stormont Parliament passed the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922, which contained 
the necessary authority to implement internment procedures. 
Regulation 23 of the Act conferred upon the Executive the 
power to arrest without warrant any person who had acted, was 
52 Antonio Vercher, Terrorism in Europe: An International Comparative Legal 
Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 48. 
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acting, or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern 
Ireland. 53 
The specific mention of internment was found in 
regulation 23B of the Act, which provided that the Minister of 
Home Affairs, on the suspicion of a chief officer of police or 
police officer of high rank that a person had acted, was 
acting, or was about to act in a manner described above, 
[Regulation 23] could order restrictions, obligations, or the 
internment of that person.~ It was this regulation, though 
slightly amended throughout the years, that provided the 
Stormont government its authority to use internment as a means 
to combat the IRA terrorist campaigns of 1921-2, 1938-9, 1956-
62 and 1970-1. 55 
To the British, the Troubles necessitated a stronger 
response from the mainland. Up until 1972 the Westminster 
government was willing to allow Stormont to handle the growing 
threat that the IRA presented. The Stormont government chose 
internment as one of their weapons of choice, and while 
Britain abolished the Stormont parliament in 1972, it kept 





From the time British Army troops were formally 
introduced in the area, Westminster had the responsibility of 
security in Ulster. Prior to then, the British interest in the 
area had been limited, and the government was unaware of the 
level of terrorist activity that existed in the region. 
Although the British had a long history in the use of 
internment, they were reluctant to employ the strategy in 
Northern Ireland. However, due to their unfamiliarity with the 
situation, they acquiesced to the wishes of the Stormont 
Government. In retrospect it has been said that the British 
government's reaction to the IRA terrorism that had developed 
in 1971 was uncomprehending, hesitant and piecemeal. 56 
The policy was charged with controversy from the outset. 
Poor intelligence, in part a result of a lack of co-operation 
between the military and the police, led to the arrest of 
significant numbers of non-involved persons. 57 What ensued was 
an ineffective attempt to secure the internment of the leaders 
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Although the 
authorities may have lacked intelligence, IRA members did not 
seem to have the same problem. Several members, including the 
ringleaders, went into hiding during this period of time. As 
a result, many more individuals not involved with the IRA were 
56G. Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), 167. 
571bid., 168. 
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interned than those who actually had a connection. Although 
Catholic communities were the targets of many of the security 
sweeps, Protestants suffered as well. The Army and the British 
government had not endeared themselves to the general 
population of Northern Ireland. 
While it is clear that internment increased the 
alienation of the Catholic population, assisted the IRA with 
recruiting and support, and caused some crossover from the 
Official to the Provisional wing of the IRA, the question that 
must be addressed is whether the use of internment produced 
the desired effect of suppressing terrorist activities. 
Statistical evidence shows that terrorist acts decreased 
during the period of 1971 through 1975. According to 
Christopher Hewitt, there is a negative corollary relationship 
between arrests for terrorism and terrorist violence, and that 
in Northern Ireland, the higher the number of terrorists 
interned, the lower the level of violence. 58 Additional 
evidence shows that, after peeking in 1972, both shooting 
incidents and explosions decreased between 1972 and 197 5. 59 
Statical evidence would appear to bear out the observation 
that, while internment may have been a political mistake, in 
58Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-terrorist Policies (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1984), 86. 
59Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1982), 478. 
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the short term it was effective. 
Although internment was abolished in 1976, the provisions 
contained in the arrest and detention portion of the PTA 
maintains a type of internment. Its use is carefully monitored 
and in contrast to the provisions of the 1970's the internee 
now has statutory recourse. Its effectiveness is still in 
question. While the use of internment appeared to have 
contributed to the decrease in violent acts, its use did not 
lead to the eradication of the IRA. 
3. Supergrasses 
The use of supergrasses (informants) represented the 
third shift in strategy since the Troubles began. 60 Its origin 
is a matter of some dispute, but most observers have concluded 
that the term "supergrass" derives from "snake in the grass" 
or from the slang phrase "grasshopper-copper."61 Although the 
system of supergrasses for terrorist offenses in Northern 
Ireland has recently been overturned by the judiciary, it 
represented one of the most controversial measures ever 
adopted to defeat terrorism. 62 
6
'1>addy Hillyard and Jane Percy-Smith, "Converting Terrorists: The Use of 
Supergrasses in Northern Ireland," Journal of Law & Society, vol. 11, no. 3 (Winter 
1984): 339. 
61Finn, 1 09. 
62Vercher, 93. 
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The supergrass strategy was born out of judicial reform. 
In its 197 3 review of the British judicial process, the 
Diplock Commission produced two significant recommendations: 
that statements obtained in breach of common law rules should 
be admitted in evidence provided that they could be shown not 
to have been obtained by subjecting the accused to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment, and that the police should 
have powers to detain suspects for questioning for up to three 
days. 63 Although internment was operative, legal statutes would 
provide another formal avenue to detain suspects. These 
recommendations, the most important of which was the abolition 
of juries, were quickly incorporated into the British judicial 
system. 
The British courts turned to the Italians' judicial 
experience of prosecuting perpetrators of political violence 
as a model. The Italians successfully utilized the supergrass 
strategy as a means to combat the Red Brigades, Italy's 
equivalent to the IRA. 
The basic concept of the supergrass strategy is simple. 
After detaining an individual suspected of a criminal or 
terrorist act, he is then interrogated at length in an attempt 
to obtain a confession. Should a confession be obtained, an 
offer of a reduced sentence or immunity is made in an exchange 
63Hillyard and Percy- Smith, 339. 
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for information which leads to an arrest of his accomplices or 
provides information against a violent organization to which 
he belongs. 
Having observed the Italian's successful use of 
informants against the Red Brigades, the British eagerly 
implemented the technique in Northern Ireland. Although the 
recruitment of supergrasses in Northern Ireland was not 
difficult, the courts only accepted the evidence of four 
supergrasses during the period from 1973-1981. 64 Many of those 
arrested willingly accepted the promise of money, immunity and 
a new life in lieu of a lengthy prison sentence. 65 However, 
despite the successful recruitment of supergrasses, problems 
subsequently arose in two areas, maintaining the informants 
and effectively utilizing their testimony in the courtroom. 
Once a supergrass was made, he and his family became the 
pawns of both the police and of the paramilitaries he was 
enlisted to testify against. The families were especially 
vulnerable. On the one hand, the police needed the family to 
support and maintain the supergrass in his commitment to be 
64A single supergrass was often used in a number of different cases. Additionally, it 
has been alleged that the police provided crucial information to the supergrasses in hard to 
solve cases which the police were eager to close. 
65Supergrass status gives prisoners extra privileges. They can have a cell of their 
own, sometimes at a police station instead of a prison. In the past supergrasses have been 
able to have color TV s in their cells, extended visits from friends and relatives, longer 
exercise and recreation periods. Vercher, 93. 
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the principle witness. On the other hand, the paramilitaries 
used the families as hostages in an effort to make the 
supergrass retract his testimony. 66 
In the courtroom, the problems associated with the use of 
suspect testimony were worsened through the use of Diplock 
Courts. In these courts, which represent the only legal system 
for terrorists, trial is by judge rather than jury. 
Additionally, should the terrorist be found guilty, the system 
itself makes the possibility of appeal minimal. 
Three areas of concern in regards to supergrass evidence 
were credibility, corroboration and the potential negative 
perceptions that a jury may have of a questionable supergrass. 
The judges wielded enormous authority in those cases which 
they tried. It was the responsibility of the judge to 
determine whether the supergrass was a credible witness. If he 
so deemed it, then the testimony would not have to be 
corroborated. And in the case of potential misperceptions, the 
judge needed to only warn himself, since there are no sitting 
juries. It was not surprising that many, both Catholics and 
Protestants, were wary of the judicial system in Northern 
Ireland. 
Between January 1982 and January 1986 twenty-seven 
potential supergrasses had been proposed in Northern Ireland. 
66Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 3 51. 
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Seventeen of those retracted their testimonies prior to 
attendance and giving evidence at trial; two cases resulted in 
acquittals; eight cases resulted in convictions. 67 However, 
during that period of time it became evident that the 
supergrass system was not only ineffective in curtailing 
violence in Northern Ireland, but it was also producing a 
judicial system that was relying too heavily on the 
uncorroborated testimonies of criminals. A number of trials 
where such evidence was allowed created a groundswell of 
concern which eventually brought the system to an end. One 
lawyer summed up the concerns following a conviction of an 
accused where the majority of evidence against him came from 
a questionable informant: 
Lawyers involved in the ... case were shattered by 
the decision .... One said to me that until then he 
had been prepared to trust judges to distinguish 
between good evidence and bad, but he now felt that 
the use of supergrasses could not be defended. 
These lawyers also felt that the chances of 
convictions being quashed on appeal were now 
slimmer, given the authority of the Lord Chief 
Justice [the presiding judge in this case] as head 
of the Bench of only eight High Court and Appeal 
Court judges. 68 
The trial's outcome brought about skepticism about the 




overturn a number of previous convictions in which the 
testimony of supergrasses was used. 
A definitive analysis cannot be made as to the overall 
effectiveness of the supergrass strategy. 69 However, the way 
it was administered helped to bring about its demise. In 1986 
as an outcome of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, the system 
was officially stopped in an effort to assure to both the 
republicans and loyalists that the administration of law in 
Northern Ireland was being applied impartially. 70 
As was the case with internment, the supergrass system 
produced some negative side effects. Police cooperation from 
citizens declined, thus creating an impediment to the 
apprehension of terrorists. There was a utility in the use of 
supergrasses; however, as the British continue to struggle in 
their efforts to classify political violence as a special type 
of criminal act, they are ultimately finding that law cannot 
69 A 1983 Chief Constable report stated that, "In one area of Belfast alone which 
suffered from a high level ofterrorist crimes, there was a reduction of73% in the murder 
rate and an overall reduction of 61% in terrorist activity." Yet, an examination of the 
sentencing patterns of criminals during that time frame would indicate that there was no 
marked increase in the number of serious crimes being prosecuted. Additionally, a review 
ofthe strategy resulted in a finding that, " ... the insignificant impact ofthe supergrass 
system on the level of violence has driven the final nails into the coffin [of the 
system]."Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 352. 
70The Agreement had as its aims, the promoting of peace and stability in Northern 
Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of 
friendship and co-operation between the people of the two countries' [Ireland and Britain], 
and also improving co-operation in combating terrorism. Vercher, Terrorism in Europe, 
402. 
61 
be used solely to solve political problems. 
C. ESCALATION OF FORCE 
Since 1921 the IRA has engaged in a relentless, at times, 
erratic campaign to reunite the two Irelands. Both the 
Stormont government in Northern Ireland and the Westminster 
government in London have dealt with political and violent 
repercussions of the IRA's efforts. 
For nearly forty-eight years, both governments were 
content to utilize the police force of Ulster to respond to 
the terrorist threats and actions of the IRA. Yet, both 
governments, over a span of six years, proceeded to utilize a 
rapid escalation response to the IRA progressing from the use 
of the police to the British army's most elite unit. 
In early 1969, the province of Northern Ireland was in 
the throws of a civil rights movement. The Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association was an organization intent on 
changing the social conditions which existed for the Catholic 
minority in Northern Ireland. The leaders of the civil rights 
movement first pursued their goals through peaceful political 
and legal action, hoping that public pressure would force 
Stormont and Westminster to undertake political, economic, and 
social reforms. 71 However, when their peaceful political means 
71John E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule ofLaw (New York: Oxford University Press), 58. 
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failed to achieve the desired results, a strategy shift to 
violent protest was employed. 
The IRA was quick to recognize the opportunities that 
existed within the civil rights movement in furthering their 
violent methods of achieving the reunification of Ireland. By 
late 1969 it had become clear that the violent turn of the 
civil rights movement was being organized by the radical IRA 
wing: 
It would be absurd to say that the present 
situation has been brought about solely by the 
machinations of the Movement. What has happened in 
fact is that the IRA/Republican Movement has been 
infiltrating and manipulating the Civil Rights 
Organization with great energy. The speed of 
success of the latter in producing the present 
condition in the streets has caught the IRA largely 
unprepared in the military sense .... 72 
The speed at which the IRA was able to influence the movement 
caught everyone by surprise and indeed may have inadvertently 
led to the sudden increase in violence that precipitated the 
retaliatory response of the Stormont and Westminster 
.governments. 
The Royal Ulster Constabulary had traditionally responded 
to Northern Ireland's recurring terrorist actions ranging from 
shootings and bombings to kidnaping; yet, it was the explosive 
outbreak of violence associated with the civil rights marches 
72Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland 1969-1984 
(Great Britain: The Chaucer Press, 1985), 20. 
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that stretched them beyond their capabilities. 
In late October, 1968, local Catholics in the city of 
Derry held a march in defiance of an order not to do so. The 
RUC's brutal attack against the peaceful, albeit illegal march 
resulted in injuries to seventy-seven civilians and eleven 
policemen. 73 The following January, the RUC refused to come to 
the aid of Catholic civil rights marchers being attacked by 
Loyalists. No one was killed, but several of the marchers were 
injured. In August of 1969, another parade erupted in the 
worst violence Northern Ireland had suffered since the early 
1920s. During the violent encounter of the Loyalists and 
Catholics, the RUC "charged with batons, only to be attacked 
in return by Catholics armed with rocks and petrol bombs. 1174 
The Chief inspector of the RUC described the rioting in 
Belfast, in which five Catholics and two Protestants were 
killed (including a nine-year-old boy), as equivalent to a "a 
state of war. 1175 
1. Royal Ulster Constabulary 
Traditionally, the police have been responsible for the 
internal security of Northern Ireland. The Royal Ulster 





The force came into being in 1922 and fell under the control 
of the Inspector-General, who was responsible to the Stormont 
Minister of Home Affairs. 76 
It was stipulated that the size of the force should be 
about 3,000 men, a third of which was supposed to be of the 
Roman Catholic faith. Although prejudicial attitudes had kept 
the actual number of Catholics on the force at an 
insignificant level, the total number of men on the force 
remained fairly constant until 1969 when the troubles in 
Ireland necessitated the need for a larger force. In 1969 
there were 3,044 members of the RUC, and by 1990 the number 
had increased nearly threefold to 8,250. 77 
Members of the RUC were full-time employees, but they 
were augmented by a part-time force known as the B Specials. 
The B Specials had served as a support unit since the 
inception of the RUC, but their numbers were dictated on an 
"as needed" basis. During the Second World War their numbers 
began to grow as the need for a paramilitary "Home-Guard" 
force came about. 
It is important to note that B Specials had regular jobs 
and usually worked with the RUC on either a part-time or on an 
"as needed basis". The lack of on-duty time in a police 
76G Davidson Smith, Combating Terrorism(London: Routledge, 1990), 198. 
77Ibid. 
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capacity was reflected in their training. Whereas the B 
Specials were trained in paramilitary type tactics, they 
lacked the necessary skills to handle the day-to-day civil 
duties. Consequently, the B Special's: 
requirement to perform ordinary police duty was 
rarely placed upon him; and, his training and 
equipment, including the types of firearms with 
which he was issued, were primarily of a military 
nature and not designed for the ordinary police 
role. 78 
Despite the lack of specific police training, the B 
Specials often worked side-by-side or independently of the 
RUC. For nearly forty-eight years those combinations of forces 
were able to keep the relative peace in Ulster. However, the 
Troubles that came out of the civil rights demonstrations 
brought peace to an end and brought in the army. 
2. British Army 
British troops had been present in Northern Ireland prior 
to the Troubles, but not for the purpose of internal-security 
duties. Since 1921 British soldiers had been stationed in 
Northern Ireland in the same manner as they had been in Great 
Britain. There existed a traditional connection between the 
British army and the region. A number of regiments were 
created in Northern Ireland and the army often recruited from 
the local population. Although the troops lived and trained in 
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Ulster, for security reason none of them served duty in 
Northern Ireland. 
All that changed with the commencement of the Troubles. 
As earlier discussed, the Troubles represented a level of 
violence that hadn't existed in Northern Ireland since 
partition. The resultant violence left Westminster with no 
choice but to further involve itself in the internal matters 
of Ulster, despite their long held policy of noninterference. 
There was continual fear among the Catholics in the 
region for their safety from the Protestants and the RUCs and 
B Specials who were assigned to protect them. Their fears were 
partly justified as evidenced by the number of killed and 
injured civil rights marchers mentioned earlier. 
The response of the RUC's and B Special's (both of whom 
were nearly exclusively comprised of Protestants) to the 
violence was not one of impartiality, but rather one of 
retaliation against the Catholics, firing rubber bullets at 
will into the gathered crowds. 79 On the eve of August 14 1969, 
the Stormont Prime Minister, fearing that the violent 
situation had grown out of control, requested that British 
troops march into Derry to restore order. In return for the 
troops, the Prime Minister agreed to place the paramilitary 
79pinn, 64. 
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B Specials under the control of the British army. 80 However, 
once the army arrived they disbanded the B Specials in 
October, preferring instead to work with the Ulster Defence 
Regiment, a more professional reserve force. 
Westminster agreed with the request and gave permission 
to the army to assist the RUCs; thus began the official 
involvement of the British army in the internal affairs of 
Northern Ireland. The initial mandate of the army was clear: 
separate and protect both sides of the internal conflict. 
However, soon after a modicum of peace was restored and yet 
the troops remained, it was clear that their role had changed: 
Before the August rioting, the role of the British 
troops in Northern Ireland has been solely to 
support the RUC and B Specials in emergencies. 
After the Derry riots, the role of the army changed 
significantly. Instead of a force of last resort, 
the army became a security agency whose primary 
purpose was to maintain public order and to collect 
intelligence concerning the IRA. The change of 
purpose was reflected in the level of staffing. 
There were fewer than 3, 000 soldiers in Ulster 
before the rioting. Four years later, 16,500 troops 
were in the province. 81 
The violence of Northern Ireland brought the army to the 
region; the inability of Stormont to govern itself and 
Britain's desire to eliminate the IRA kept them there. 




clear escalation in the response Westminster was willing to 
employ against the IRA. The IRA was also prepared to increase 
their level of violence in response. 
From 1970, the British army waged a campaign to stop the 
violence, and the Catholic minority initially viewed the army 
as saviors. The citizens expected and received a relative 
state of peace. However, as the army carried out a series of 
new and unpopular government initiatives, consisting of 
internment, supergrasses and exclusion orders, the Catholics, 
as well as some Protestants, began to see them as oppressors. 
The IRA was able to capitalize on this perception by appealing 
to the sympathies of the Catholics. 
The British army proved very capable in their efforts to 
separate the Catholics and Protestants. Having set up no-go 
areas in the Catholic ghettos, they initially served as 
"border guards" among the various cities. 
Although the army was effective in keeping the two sides 
apart, they could do nothing to bridge the political gap 
between the IRA and Westminister. The IRA continued their 
covert terrorist actions, no longer under the guise of the 
civil rights movement but with the fervor of their true goal 
of reunification. 
By 1972, the IRA had succeeded in disrupting Stormont's 
ability to govern effectively. Westminister lost patience with 
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the Ulster government and in March they took control of the 
region, instituting Direct Rule in Northern Ireland. 
Ultimately, it was the IRA's violence, not the civil 
rights pressures which had been building up in the Catholic 
community, that brought an end to a government that had 
existed since the partition. For decades Westminster had been 
completely insensitive to the problems of the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland; it became sensitive only because of 
violence. In abolishing the Stormont Parliament, a declared 
objective of the IRA, Westminster was not in any sense 
surrendering its sovereignty over Northern Ireland but it was 
seen to yield politically to the bomb and the bullet. 82 
Westminster attempted a more aggressive approach to 
governing, enacting several legislative and judicial reforms, 
already described, designed to bring the IRA to its knees. The 
army was tasked to carry out many of those reforms. The new 
policies were controversial with many people feeling they 
intruded too much on civil liberties. It was not surprising 
then to see that the army began to suffer some backlash from 
their presence. One army commander knew that their welcome 
would not last long stating, "The honeymoon period between 
82Stephen Haseler, The Death ofBritish Democracy: A Study ofBritain's Political 
Present and Future (New York: Prometheus Books, 1976), 105. 
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troops and local people is likely to be short lived. " 83 He 
realized that his men might become the targets for mob hatred 
and violence from sides if the political problems were not 
solved quickly. His forecast turned out to be accurate. 
The British government had failed to eradicate the IRA 
with legislation alone and despite the efforts of the army, 
the IRA remained intact. One of the army's problems was its 
inability to adjust to the IRA's use of guerrilla tactics; 
additionally, the IRA's ability to blend into the civilian 
community made them a difficult enemy to combat. 
3. Military Elite: The Special Air Service 
However, there was one segment of the army that had 
significant experience in unconventional warfare, the Special 
Air Service Regiment. The public use of the SAS in Northern 
Ireland had been resisted for a number of years due to the 
political signal Westminster felt it would send. Westminster 
had already experienced troubles explaining the continued use 
of regular army troops in the police assistance role; they 
were not prepared to have to explain the presence of their 
most elite war-fighting regiment which had previously been 
employed to fight only against guerrillas in British colonies 
or protectorates. All that changed, however, in 1976 when, in 
the Northern Ireland county of South Armagh, the fighting 
83Hamill, 21. 
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techniques of the IRA overwhelmed the capabilities of the 
regular army. 
Armagh is located on the border of Ulster and the Irish 
Republic, making it an ideal location for IRA activities. The 
IRA was able to use the area as a way station for smuggling 
arms into the country, as well as exploiting the resources of 
a number of sympathetic Catholics. 
The army had stationed a number of troops in the area but 
the IRA had a strategic advantage in the region. With Armagh's 
location along the border of Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic, the IRA readily crossed the border to elude pursuers 
from either region. The IRA exacted a significant death toll 
on the British army. During the same period of time in the 
conflict between the two sides, forty-nine British army troops 
had died in comparison to zero casualties for the IRA. 84 
The flash point for Westminster occurred as a result of 
a particular bloody period in Armagh. During the six months 
prior to the SAS's public commitment to Ulster, 21 civilians 
were murdered in the border area as part of a tit-for-tat war 
of sectarian killings. 85 Among those killings was an IRA 
retaliatory strike that resulted in the death of ten 
84Tony Geraghty, Inside the S.A.S: The Story of the Amazing Elite British 
Commando Force (New York: Balentine Books, 1980), 173. 
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Protestants. Westminster could no longer ignore the civilian 
cries for help in the region and the regular army troops could 
not effectively combat the IRA guerilla style of fighting. 
Consequently, in January 1976, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 
publicly announced from the House of Commons, that a squadron 
of eighty SAS men would be sent to Northern Ireland to track 
down the leaders of the IRA in South Armagh. With this first 
use of the SAS, Westminster was making a public statement that 
the IRA had become an intolerable threat to both Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and that threat deserved the response of 
Britain's military elite. 
Training for members of the SAS is among the most 
thorough, strenuous and arduous that military personnel can 
participate in. All members of the SAS are volunteer soldiers 
chosen from regular army companies. Specialized training in 
weapons, intelligence gathering, foreign language skills, 
hand-to-hand combat, interrogation techniques, and insertion 
and extraction techniques were all part of the specific 
education and training that each SAS soldier possessed that 
the regular army personnel did not. The SAS perfected their 
unconventional warfare style of fighting in a number of hot 
spots: Malaya 1950-59; Oman 1958-59; Borneo 1962-66; Aden and 
its hinterland, the Radfan 1964-67; Yemen 1963-67; Oman again 
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1970-76. 86 It was these hard fought battles which earned the 
SAS the reputation of being the premiere fighting force in 
Britain's combat arsenal--one that in 1976 was directed 
against the IRA. 
Although the IRA had increased the tempo of their 
terrorist campaign, it was, in fact, the actions of the 
Protestants which brought the SAS to the shores of Northern 
Ireland. The first traceable insertion of the SAS into an 
anti-terrorist role inside the United Kingdom came in 
September 1969, when a group of SAS men was dispatched to 
Northern Ireland to track down the routes by which, it was 
persistently rumored, the Protestants were smuggling arms into 
the province. 87 Britain's Westminster government, sensitive to 
perceptions that the Northern Ireland situation had grown so 
out of control that it would warrant a response of Britain's 
most elite military force, sent the SAS in under the guise of 
a "deniable" operation. That is, the SAS would have no 
official sanction to be in the region. Additionally, in 
further efforts to conceal the SAS' s participation, SAS 
members were sent back to their regular army units; they were 
no longer SAS members but were instead highly skilled regular 
86Sunday Times (London) Siege: Princess Gate, London April30- May 5 (London: 
Hamlyn, 1980), I 03. 
870bserver (London), Siege: Six Days at the Iranian Embassy (London: MacMillan 
Books, 1980), 107. 
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soldiers. It could now be said that small groups and 
individuals of the SAS had been using their intelligence 
gathering expertise in the Ulster region for a number of 
years. 
Fortunately for Westminster, the SAS successfully 
completed their mission in relatively short time and without 
incident. Buoyed by their successful deployment of the 
Regiment the first time, Westminster again sent the SAS back 
to the region in 1974, still in a "deniability" status in 
order to mount covert surveillance of suspected IRA leaders. 88 
Westminster had succeeded in its goal of retaking control 
of South Armagh. Although the public orders for the SAS had 
been to bring peace to the area, what wasn't said publicly was 
the SAS' s explicit orders: Do what the regular army could 
not ... kill terrorists. It was a stunningly efficient 
performance, after five months, the top ten local IRA men were 
either dead, in custody, or hiding over the border89 • Despite 
Westminster's earlier concerns about public perception, 
reality proved much kinder to the government: 
In any event, Whitehall was far from unhappy at the 
stir the SAS was causing over the water. Every 
thunderous condemnation of their achievements 
merely added to the unit's reputation, which in 
turn deterred the youth of the province from 
880bserver, 107. 
89Sunday Times (London), 103. 
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joining the IRA. 90 
The short-term tactical gain was impressive. The SAS was 
successful in their initial control of the IRA activities. 
Their extensive use of intelligence was key in identifying a 
number of IRA operatives, and curtailing the arms smuggling 
that were occurring between the two Irelands. The SAS also 
sported a low casualty rate. From 1976 to 1980 the SAS lost 
only one man; in contrast, the regular army and Ulster Defense 
Regiment lost eighty-two men in the same period. 91 
The result of SAS participation in Northern Ireland was 
twofold. On the one hand, they excelled in intelligence 
gathering techniques. Maintaining a database of information on 
the IRA was essential in curtailing their activities. The 
number of terrorist acts did decline after the SAS's arrival. 
On the other hand, the recurring theme of political primacy 
came to light, in that, despite the SAS's excellent tactical 
performance against the IRA, they could not bring an end to 
the political war that existed between the IRA and the British 
government. 
D. ANALYSIS 
The previous discussion on the British decision to 
escalate the use of force points to an important concept. 
90Ibid., 109. 
91Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1982), 478. 
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Political primacy, that is, dealing with the root political 
causes of the British-IRA conflict, is the key to solving the 
terrorist threat posed by the IRA. The legislative and 
judicial reforms that were enacted were ultimately 
unsuccessful in eliminating the IRA. In the case of the use of 
force, escalating from the police to the elite SAS only served 
to provide tactical wins, but failed to have a significant 
impact on the political objective of eliminating the IRA. This 
crucial point was acknowledged in the research of Tony 
Geraghty: 
The campaign of terrorism and guerilla warfare in 
Northern Ireland seems certain to continue until 
the men of violence are isolated from their host 
communities. But -unlike the Third World- Ireland 
is not a place where that isolation can be achieved 
by building protective villages for non-combatants 
while converting large parts of the country 
elsewhere into "free-fire"zones ... in this case, 
isolation of terrorists has to be achieved 
politically, in men's minds, as well as 
militarily. 92 
The cases show that, as a tool of the government, the 
military cannot function as political ambassadors. They can 
only serve as military ambassadors in support of political 
aims. In the case of terrorism, the army, specifically the 
SAS, proved effective in achieving the government's military 
objectives against the IRA, but without the government's 
92Geraghty, 185. 
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ability to concurrently achieve the political objectives of 
stopping the IRA, the war continues. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
According to the FBI, there have been 13 domestic 
terrorist incidents in the United States since 1993. Eleven of 
those occurred on a single night when animal rights activists 
placed small incendiary devices in four Chicago department 
stores that sold furs. The death toll of those eleven 
incidents, plus one other was zero. However, on February 26, 
1993 a bomb ripped through the World Trade Center killing six 
persons. Two years later, on April 19, 1995 a massive 
explosion destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, killing 168 men, women and children. Those two 
explosions signaled to the general public that the United 
States is vulnerable to domestic terrorist attacks. The 
spotlight on the bombings also reignited the discussion on the 
means the U.S. possesses to protect its citizens. 
This thesis presented two parallel stories of how nations 
have dealt with domestic violence and the use of the military. 
The stories, one of legislation in the United States that 
curtailed the domestic use of the military and one of 
legislation in the United Kingdom that increased the use of 
the military both provide hints as to the concerns the U.S. 
might address in response to a potentially changing security 
environment involving the increased death toll of Americans 
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from terrorist incidents. 
The impetus for the British legislation was the 
activities of the IRA in Northern Ireland. In that case the 
violence grew to a point where normal legislative and security 
policies were no longer effective to counter the terrorist 
threat. As a result, stronger, more restrictive measures were 
enacted through the use of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Acts and the domestic use of the 
military. 
The British responded by enacting several legislative 
statutes which limited the rights of the accused while 
enhancing the ability of law enforcement agencies and the 
legal system to apprehend and prosecute suspected terrorists. 
In the wake of the latest American bombings, the United States 
has responded by attempting to enact several laws which would 
accomplish the same goals. 
On February 10, 1995, a counterterrorism bill drafted by 
the Clinton Administration was introduced in the Senate and 
the House of Representatives. The Omnibus Counterterrorism 
Bill attempted to introduce far-reaching measures to 
strengthen the federal government's ability to combat domestic 
and international terrorism. The bill would give the 
government greater leeway in its ability to classify certain 
specific acts of violence as terrorist rather than criminal in 
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nature. The classification is important in that, under the 
proposed bill, terrorist acts would fall under the 
jurisdiction of federal authorities, unlike other criminal 
acts, presumably making it easier to prevent and punish acts 
of terrorism. 
However, concerns have been raised as to the 
constitutionality of several of the proposals and their 
encroachment on the civil liberties of citizens of the United 
States. Of specific concern are the provisions which would: 
1) authorize the Justice Department (meaning the FBI) to 
pick and choose crimes to investigate and prosecute based on 
political beliefs and associations; 
2) expand a pre-trial detention scheme that puts the 
burden of proof on the accused; 
3) loosen the carefully-crafted rules governing federal 
wiretaps, in potential violation of the Fourth Amendment; 
4) establish special courts that would use secret 
evidence to order the deportation of persons convicted of no 
crimes, in violation of basic principle of due process; 
5) permit permanent detention without judicial review by 
the Attorney General of aliens convicted of crimes; 
6) give the President unreviewable power to criminalize 
fund-raising for lawful activities associated with unpopular 
causes; and 
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7) renege on the Administration's approval in the last 
Congress of a provision to insure that the FBI would not 
investigate individuals or organizations based on First 
Amendment activities. 93 
These provisions generated much discussion over the 
potential danger they represent to the civil liberties of 
Americans. In a speech given in Washington, D.C. in April 
1995, Roy Orbison, President of the National Strategic 
Information Center and Associate Professor at Georgetown 
University made clear his concerns on the bill, which he 
believes to be too intrusive. He stated that, "while we need 
to defend ourselves against terrorism, we must simultaneously 
defend our civil liberties. The law, and law enforcement, must 
not impede constitutional freedoms." 
Concerns also were raised that the legislation was an 
overreaction to the recent terrorist incidents which have 
occurred within the past three years. One commentary stated 
that: 
Terrorism, like war, always gives government an 
opportunity to grow. The threat to law and order 
seems to call for an adjustment in the balance 
between liberty and public safety. The World Trade 
Center and Oklahoma City terrorist bombings are no 
exceptions. The dust had hardly settled in Oklahoma 
before the President and some in Congress began the 
headlong rush toward increasing federal 
93Karla P. Fears, Thesis: The FBI and Domestic Counterterrorism: A Comparative 
Analysis (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1995), 53-54. 
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jurisdiction over various crimes. The vehicle for 
this expansion is President Clinton's "Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act of 1995." 94 
However, given the fact that the legislation was proposed 
prior to the bombings, one may assume that there already 
existed a growing concern over the increase in terrorism. Yet 
that concern apparently wasn't strong enough to get the 
proposed bill out of committee. Instead another version 
surfaced. 
In April 1996, Congress passed the Anti terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), sponsored by 
Republican Senator, Robert Dole of Kansas. The Act originated 
from the omnibus bill, but removed virtually all the 
provisions that would have widened and strengthened the 
authority of the FBI and the Attorney General in deterring, 
monitoring and prosecuting terrorists. AEDPA instead provides 
watered-down provisions that ban financial support to nations 
or foreign organizations considered to be terrorist, and a 
requirement that terrorists make restitution to their victims. 
President Clinton had certainly wanted a stronger law. 
Prior to the bill's passage Clinton made clear his concern 
that the bill being sponsored by Dole was weak in comparison 
to his own, stating that, "If we're going to have a bill, we 
94David W. Neuendorf, Terrorism Bill Should Be Stopped (Internet, 
http://dialin.ind.net/-dneuendo/index.html, 1995). 
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need a real bill. It needs to be a bill that will help us to 
combat terrorism at home and abroad. So I hope that when this 
bill gets into conference it will be made much stronger." 95 
Clinton wasn't the only one disappointed with the Act. 
The ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, John 
Conyers, Jr. of Michigan stated that, "what we have here is a 
low-grade crime bill, filled with the cats and dogs that have 
been laying around here for years," and adding, "This is a 
baloney sandwich with no meat on it. " 96 
Although the President and some members of Congress were 
disappointed with the content of the bill, the public 
apparently was satisfied, as the bill passed both houses and 
became law. While Americans may be concerned with the increase 
in domestic terrorism, they have not reached the point where 
they are ready to give up a significant measure of their civil 
liberties. 
Among the provisions that were not included in the Dole 
amendment, but still reside in Clinton's languishing bill, is 
the clause which would allow for the employment of the 
military in domestic law enforcement. As a result, it would 
appear that the Posse Comitatus Act again had come under 
95Stephen Labaton, "After Trims, House Passes Counterterrorism Measure," New 
York Times", 15 March 1996. 
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attack by an administration which feels that the statute 
prevents the President from utilizing all the resources at his 
disposal in a forthright and legal manner. 
Despite the administration's desire to repeal the 
statute, strong opposition continues. According to the 
National Center for National Security Studies, the section in 
the Clinton bill requesting the expanded use of the military 
would provide a wholesale exemption from one of the oldest 
protections in American law, the separation between military 
and police. 97 The section provides that in the course of an 
investigation or apprehension the Attorney General may request 
assistance "from any Federal, State, or local agency, 
including the Army, Navy and Air Force, any statute, rule or 
regulation to the contrary notwithstanding." 
It appears, for now, that neither scholars nor 
politicians are ready to end the 120 year old statute. Roy 
Godson's comments on the subjects included his warning on the 
steps the U.S. may be taking to disrupt terrorism, stating 
that, "We academics, policy makers, and certainly in a 
democracy such as ours, the public--need to understand what 
disruption is, and what it is not ... It does not include 
granting special police powers to the military or other non-
97Center For National Security Studies, Clinton Terrorism Legislation Threatens 
Constitutional Rights (Washington D.C.: Gelman Library, 1995), 5. 
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law enforcement entities." 
Although we can utilize the British model of legislative 
reforms as a comparative tool to hypothesize the direction 
future U.S. legislation may take, in the near-term Americans 
seem satisfied with the current cautious approach. In regards 
to the domestic use of the military, the United States may 
learn valuable information by examining the British army's own 
assessment of their role in domestic affairs. Desmond Hamill, 
in his study of the army's presence in Northern Ireland 
between 1969 and 1984 concluded that military presence in 
Britain should only exist under very specific conditions. 
In 1969, when the Army moved onto the streets of Northern 
Ireland, the common military and political view was that the 
crisis would be resolved by the deterrence of the threat of 
force; by the use of force, particularly lethal force; and by 
the reassurance which the presence of the Army would give. 98 
That did not turn out to the case. Members of the army found 
themselves involved in situations for which they were 
unprepared. Trained as efficient fighting men who were 
prepared to kill the enemy if necessary, they found themselves 
dealing with the unfamiliarity of facing their own citizens 
and different rules of engagement. The results were one of 
uncertainty and confusion as to their role in quelling 
98Hamill, 279. 
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domestic disturbances. One observer of the army's role said: 
I don't think many people who were not soldiers in 
Ulster in the early days realize the nightmare 
pressure and the difficulties. It wasn't just a 
fear of death or injury, although that had an 
effect. It was the feeling of uncertainty, 
frustration and helplessness; of not understanding 
what was involved, or what ought to be done, or 
what was going to happen next. Among well trained, 
disciplined and moral troops this leads to 
involvement in activity for its own sake, which 
gives the illusion of achievement, while the 
situation slowly slips away. It leads to demands 
for will-o' -the-wisp solutions- like internment, 
cross-border cooperation, hot pursuit across the 
border, direct liaison with the Irish Army. But 
none of these would make any decisive difference. 
That's with good troops! With bad ones the results 
are terrifying. 99 
Senior army officers concluded that their role in 
domestic affairs should be severely restrained, and that the 
primary role of maintaining domestic order should fall on the 
police. The military leaders also recommended that, should the 
army be called in, there should be no question as to the chain 
of command, adding that either the police or the military 
should be totally subordinate to the other. 
In regards to the military elite, namely the SAS, the 
recommendation was that their use be ruled out in all domestic 
disturbances. Despite their success in Northern Ireland, it 
was found that highly trained, motivated and elite assault 
units can sometimes cause as many problems as they solve 
991bid., 280. 
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unless commanded by exceptional leaders of intelligence and 
moral stature . 100 
Although the British military clearly wishes to stay 
clear of domestic affairs, they would feel more comfortable 
about entering a situation if specific guidelines were 
maintained as to their use. Specifically, three fundamental 
questions would have to be asked: First, what is the threat? 
Second, what has failed within the civil administration? 
Third, how is the local population involved or affected? 101 
"Only when these questions are fully answered," said one 
officer, "can the role of the army, and the intricate business 
of relations with the police, be decided. Until then, any 
discussion on all this is rather like the Zen Bhuddist process 
of 'meditating about the sound of one hand clapping.' " 102 
Within the United States armed forces, the same concerns 
should be shared. If someday the domestic use of the military 
should become necessary, we should expect from the British 
experience that their use should be severely restricted. 
Considerations should be made as to the scope of the mission, 
the exhaustion of all civil remedies, the timetable for 





disorders, and the establishment of a clear chain of command. 
Finally, the United States must ask itself if it would be 
opening Pandora's box by eliminating or reducing the 
restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. Should those 
restrictions be lifted, the extent to which the military could 
be used domestically could expand beyond those currently 
envisioned by those who seek its repeal. 
It was shown in the British example that domestic 
military use in Northern Ireland, while at first designed to 
simply quell the violence brought on by the Troubles, turned 
into a mission those military forces were not expecting or 
equipped to handle properly. Perhaps the same situation could 
happen here in the United States. Had the military been used 
in the two and a half month standoff with the Freemen in 
Montana, for example, would both the American public and the 
military have seen it as a military occupation? 
The future domestic security environment of the United 
States may dictate the limited need for domestic use of the 
military to combat domestic terrorism. Present and future 
administrations should be mindful of the potential dangers 
that may present themselves through the erosion of the 
constitutional protection afforded in such legislation as the 
Posse Comitatus Act. The United States' legislative history 
coupled with the British experience with the IRA in Northern 
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Ireland, provides a road map to follow in initially examining 
possible future courses of action in response to potential 
domestic terrorist threats. 
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